fold" of the experience; it is a single experience, not two separable experiences. He explains the idea of two-folded perception in terms of seeing-in, which for present purposes can be classed with seeing-as, both of which Wittgenstein famously discussed. 3 Under whichever name, it is commonplace; we exercise this capacity in seeing a passing cloud as a camel or a bird or in seeing a face in a mountain or a fire, without being under the illusion that we are actually seeing a camel or a bird, or a face. The capacity for seeing-infor perceiving in a two-folded manner-for Wollheim, is a real and irreducible perceptual and phenomenological phenomenon: In principle, it can be investigated in psychology, evolutionary psychology, and perhaps biology, but not explained without remainder, defined, or reductively analyzed in such terms. And like seeing itself, the capacity is phenomenological bedrock: it cannot be defined in more basic phenomenological terms.
That one object can be seen in another (by the envisaged audience) is necessary but not sufficient for the latter's depicting the former. In addition, a marked surface represents a given object only if the marked surface's maker has his or her intention fulfilled that the depicted object can be seen by the envisaged audience in the marked surface. Thus, a marked surface represents a given item if and only if the maker successfully intends that the envisaged audience can see the depicted item in the marked surface.
II
Hyman raises three main objections to the theory. The first is minor and calls only for a minor adjustment. He observes that it is not the case that one always sees the depicted object in front of (or behind) the picture's surface or the ground of the image, 4 as Wollheim says in, for example, Painting as an Art: "I discern something standing out in front of, or (in certain cases) receding behind, something else." 5 For example, children's stick figure drawings or the figures in certain egyptian vases lack this feature. There is no harm in simply granting the point. In certain cases, the figures are relatively schematic, as much hieroglyphs or icons as realistic drawings or paintings. 6 They are still depictions, as Hyman says, but there is no reason not to accept that the recession or precession in seeing one thing in another can be indeterminate or even absent. Switching to ernst Gombrich's way of speaking, we can maintain that, in certain cases, only the minimal psychological triggers for representational seeing are activated, even if for more realistic pictures additional triggers come into play. 7 We can on Wollheim's behalf insert "typically" in the sentence quoted above.
The second region of criticism concerns Wollheim's intentional criterion of correctness: of the set of things that can be seen in a marked surface, the marked surface depicts only those that the artist intended should be seen in it.
Hyman first doubts the necessity of Wollheim's criterion. 8 He notes that the artist may intend to depict, say, a larch-intend that a larch (and only a larch) should be seen in the picture-but, nevertheless, depict a spruce, not a larch. To this, a simple answer is that the artist in such a case did, all the same, intend successfully to put a tree in his picture, which takes intentional precedence over his more detailed thoughts concerning the type of tree. 9 A more substantive answer is to invoke the sort of thing that Keith Donnellan says about the man drinking a martini-or perhaps what Hilary Putnam says about elms and beeches, or what Saul Kripke says about speaker's reference and semantic reference, or what Tyler Burge says about arthritis. 10 The case is not described in enough detail to choose from among these types of responses. But, essentially, if one says "Prune that larch," of what is, in fact, a spruce, we have to allow the possibility that one should be credited with the command expressed by "Prune that spruce," even though the words uttered as standardly construed command the listener to prune a larch. What the many options allowing for this have in common is that, under certain circumstances, one can intend (mean, refer to, represent, perceive) something even if one misdescribes it in public language or in thought, or even misconceives it in thought, either one-off or habitually. None of the options just mentioned holds the field, and they deal with different aspects of the phenomenon; but the point is that the problem is of much greater scope than the problem facing Wollheim's position; it afflicts anyone who employs the concept of intention and its cohorts in epistemology, philosophy of language, philosophy of mind, or the theory of action. The follower of Wollheim can happily accept that the theory awaits the satisfactory resolution of these more fundamental issues in semantics or pragmatics.
Hyman next points to certain pictures that challenge the sufficiency of Wollheim's criterion: "Picasso sometimes invites the spectator to see a penis in the part of a picture that depicts a nose or a tongue, or a vulva or anus in the part that depicts a mouth, but it would be inaccurate to say that these things are actually depicted."
11 Again, such cases call for further elaboration of the theory and are by no means fatal to it. Call the things that are properly depicted (the nose, the tongue, the mouth) items of level-1 representational content; call the other things (penis, vulva, anus) items of level-2 representational content (I take it that Hyman means to exclude such cases as death personified in a skull in Guercino's Et in Arcadia ego, since the abstract idea of death is simply not the sort of thing that can literally be depicted, at least not in the sense at issue). What is the distinction? Obviously level-1 content can exist without level-2 content. But a necessary condition of a depicting item's having level-2 content is that the item has level-1 content: for level-2 representational content presupposes the existence of level-1 representational content. A further necessary condition is that the artist successfully intends the level-1 representational content to integrate spatially into the picture as a whole, whereas the artist successfully intends level-2 content to repel it. Taken together, the conditions are necessary and sufficient. Seeing the mouth in the surface is, thus, level-1, whereas seeing a vulva is level-2. Of the mouth-vulva, one can see the vulva in isolation but cannot make sense of the total picture under that interpretation. Depiction proper is restricted to level-1. One who sees the vulva in the picture but not the mouth is making a different mistake, and normally a greater mistake, than one who sees a mouth in the picture but not the vulva: one misses what the picture depicts.
The third area of objection is the most thoroughgoing but also the most puzzling, since it seems to take an advertised feature of the view for a fault. Hyman states, "The last objection to Wollheim's theory, and the most consequential one, is that he quietly shirks the task he sets himself: defining the kind of perception he call "seeing-in." 12 And:
Wollheim offers, as an example, the case where "I recognize a naked boy" in the marks on a stained wall. But I do not really recognize or discern a naked boy in these marks because there is no boy for me to recognize or discern. Neither is my experience indistinguishable from the experience of recognizing or discerning a boy. If it were, it would be an illusion, but that, as Wollheim himself rightly insists, is not the case. So what kind of experience is this quasi-recognising of a naked boy supposed to be? 13 Hyman adds, "Wollheim fails to address these questions. . . . [H]e does not tell us anything about its specific nature because the fact that the something is a boy is not explained." 14 But, if Wollheim is right, then, of course, there is nothing to say in direct response to Hyman's question, for the question assumes that there is an answer when, according to the view, there is no answer. Seeing-in, as I stressed at the beginning, is phenomenologically basic. There is no effort at philosophical definition because the task is reckoned impossible. Maybe this is not perfectly explicit in Wollheim's writings, but it is evident nonetheless, and even in such remarks as Hyman quotes: it "is a distinct kind of perception. . . . [T]heorists of representation consistently overlook or reduce this phenomenology with the result that they garble representation." 15 In a later essay, Wollheim says that "we must not expect . . . a description from which someone who never had the experience could learn what it would be like to do so. . . . [T]he philosophical point of phenomenological description . . . [is] to see how some particular experience can, in virtue of what it is like, do what it does." 16 And in his 2003 exchange with Robert Hopkins, Wollheim says, of the experience of seeing-in, "to think that enough needs to be said so that someone who didn't believe that there are such experiences is convinced of their existence is to succumb to unrealistic standards." Wollheim does offer various remarks about seeing-in, which make more of the character of the phenomenon more explicit-especially expansive are the ones at 217ff of his "Seeing-as, Seeing-in, and Pictorial Representation" that elucidate the phenomenon and connect it to the imagination-but there is no ambition to define the experience or to reduce it. So the response to Hyman's objection is that it does "succumb to unrealistic standards"-that it insists on the very thing that, according to Wollheim, is not possible.
Of course, Wollheim might be wrong about this. Maybe seeing-in can after all be reductively analyzed, presumably in phenomenological terms; maybe alternatives to Wollheim's attempts at elucidation might fare better, or maybe the idea is too problematic and should simply be dropped. One can name Malcolm Budd, John Hopkins, Kendall Walton, Dominic Lopes, John Kulvicki, Katerina Bantinaki, Fabian Dorsch, and Avner Baz as among Wollheim's critics, ranging from constructive (for example, Dorsch) to destructive (for example, Baz). 18 But many theorists continue to accept the idea even if they accept that it needs modification. Hyman's saying merely that Wollheim fails to define the notion is no criticism.
III
According to Wollheim, the essential relation between a picture and the object that it depicts runs through the mind. According to Hyman, it does not: the relation is that of objective similarity in occlusion shape (or, more or less, in outline shape). And if we think of shadows on walls or photographs, it is hard not to agree with Hyman; the relation, at least in central cases, is simply a geometric or optical relation, fit to be studied by the methods of impersonal science, not those of introspective psychology or the humanities. But contrary pressure is felt if we ask why we are obsessed with pictures and make two further observations: (1) that, at least in some cases, similarity of occlusion shape alone is inadequate to explain depiction, as in the case of a single brushstroke depicting a bird or the distorted figures in Klee, de Kooning, or Picasso; and (2) that, in certain, possibly counterfactual circumstances, objective similarity does not cause the experience necessary for seeing a depiction as a depiction, but some other property-say, some other geometrical relation or some motley assortment of features that engage our visual system. What seemingly qualifies these as examples of depiction is their capacity to bring about the required experience 19 (which, for Wollheim, is that of two-folded seeing), suggesting that Hyman's view is at most only contingently adequate (for Michael Newall, it is not even that; 20 and note the parallel with Kripke's argument for the independence of pain from its physical basis 21 ). Of (1), Hyman is well aware of these cases and addresses the challenge they pose. 22 I do not believe that Hyman considers in print the challenge posed by (2) or know what he would make of it. But I do think the
